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Mich. 15 ; and whether the consideration is adequate or not, is a
question which the court will not examine. If the contract shows
on its face a legal consideration, it is sufficient; but whether
adequate or inadequate to the restraint imposed, must be determined
by the parties themselves, upon their own view of the circum-
stances attending the particular transaction; whereas, if it were
otherwise, it would be the court and not the parties making the
contract : Guerand v. Dandeet, 32 Md. 561. It has been stated
that the reasonableness of the consideration is a question of law,
evidence not being admissible outside of the contract, therefore
the cause of the consideration must be disclosed. 2 Addison on
Cont. 741, bottom paging and note (g).
EUGENE McQUILLAN.
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RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
Court of Appeal.
JOSEPH v. LYONS.
A registered bill of sale of personal property which includes stock in trade to be
afterwards acquired is, as to such stock in trade, only a.contract to assign and the
vendee takes only an equitable title. Such vendee cannot maintain tr6ver for
the property against a bona fide pledgee, who received such goods from the vendor
in the ordinary course of business.
In the absence of anything to lead the pledgee to believe a bill of sale existed, he
is not chargeable with constructive notice by reason of his failure to inquire if there
was such a registered bill of sale.
APPEAL of the defendant from the judgment of HUDDLESTON,
B.. at trial, in an action to recover 17 11. for the detinue and con-
version of certain jewelry which the plaintiff claimed under a bill
of sale.
By a duly registered bill of sale, dated February 3d 1881, F.
Manning, by way of security for certain money due from him to the
plaintiff, assigned to the plaintiff the goodwill and interest of him,
the said F. Manning, in the business of a gold and silversmith, car-
ried on by him at a certain shop in Worcester, and also all the stock-
in-trade in or about or belonging to the premises, and also. all the
stock-in-trade which should or might at any time during the con-
tinuance. of the security be brought into the premises or be appro-
priated to the use thereof, either in addition to, or in substitution
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for, the stock-in-trade then being thereon or belonging thereto. It
was provided that Manning should not, whilst in possession, remove
the chattels from the premises without the consent of the plaintiff.
The deed also contained a declaration that all future property there-
inbefore assigned should be subject to the security thereby made,
and the powers, covenants, and provisions thereinbefore contained,
although the same or any part thereof might not be capable of pass-
ing at law by the assignment thereinbefore contained.
Manning pledged with the defendant, a pawnbroker at Birming-
ham, certain jewelry which had been brought on* to the business
premaises as stock-in-trade after the date of the bill of sale. The.
defendant received the pledge in the ordinary course of business
and without actual notice of the bill of sale.
At the trial of an action by the plaintiff to recover the jewelry
or its value from the defendant, HUDDLESTON, B., gave judgment
for the plaintiff for 1711., to be reduced to one shilling on the goods
being returned to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.
Jeif, Q. 0., and Olay, for the appellant.
A. T. Lawrence, and -Darling, for the respondent.
BRETT, M. R., after stating the facts, said-It was argued for
the plaintiff that the bill of sale gave him the legal property in the
after-acquired goods whenever they should come into the possession
of Manning on the premises. For the defendant it was argued
that the bill of sale only gave the plaintiff an equitable property in
the goods. It was ingeniously argued for the plaintiff that the bill
of sale was equivalent at law to a contract on the part of Manning
that when any goods should come on to his premises for his business
they should become the legal property of the plaintiff, and the case
was likened to a contract of purchase and sale of unspecific goods,
where the property does not pass at the moment of the contract,
but when the goods are appropriated. Let us see what the law is.
For a long series of years, where a bill of sale has assumed to
assign future property to come upon the premises of the grantor,
it has been held by the common-law courts that that assignment
does not pass the legal property in the goods, even when they have
come on to the premises. The courts of equity have always held
that, in those circumstances, when the goods have come upon the
premises, the interest of the assignee under the bill of sale is not a
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legal, but only an equitable, inter.est. Therefore the case is decided
by authority. The interpretation in equity was that the document
was considered as equivalent to a contract that, when the goods
should be acquired, then there should be an equitable property in
them. It was equivalent to a contract. They said that it was to
be supposed that the parties intended that there should be some
security, and that the court should say that it was an equitable con-
tract that, when the goods should come into possession, there should
be an equitable property in them. It seems to me that the language
of JESSEL, Al. R., in Collyer v. _Taaes, is exceedingly plain, and
that, according to ordinary interpretation, it means what I have
stated. He says, "The creditor had a mortgage security on exist-
ing chattels, and the benefit of what was, in form, an assignment
of non-existing chattels which might be afterwards brought on to.
the premises. That assignment, in fact, constituted only a con-
tract to give him the after-acquired chattels. A man cannot in
equity; any more than at law "-he does not say "make a contract
to," but-" assign what has no existence. Any man can con-
tract to assign property which is to come into existence in the
future, and, when it has come into existence, equity, treating as
done that which ought to be done, fastens upon that property, and
the contract to assign thus becomes a complete assignment." The
contract is the governing thing there, and the clear meaning is that
the contract becomes a complete assignment in equity and not in
law.
It follows, therefore, that. the interest of the plaintiff in these
goods, even after they had come into the possession of Manning,
was only an equitable interest. The legal interest-i. e., the legal
property-was in Manning. Therefore Manning, having, the
legal property, takes that property which at common law is his,
and pledges it for an advance of money. The right of the pledgee
in England as to goods which are the legal property of the pledger
is not an equitable, but a legal right. It is a legal right, to be
enforced by legal remedies. Therefore, the title of the defendant
is a legal right-that of the plaintiff is only an equitable interest.
In those circumstances the plaintiff could not maintain against the
defendant the legal remedy of trover and detinue.
It was suggested that the defendant was not to be considered a
bona fide purchaser, because, if he had inquired, he would have
learned the position of Manning. That is ; far-fetched argument,
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for which there is no foundation. There was another point made
for the defendant. It was said that Manning was an agent for sale
within the meaning of the Factors Acts. The answer is that such
an agent is one who is selling for a principal; but, according to the
circumstances of this case, Manning was to sell for himself, and not
for a principal. The plaintiff fails here because the defendant, as
against him, has a superior right.
COTTON, L. J.-In this case the action was to recover certain
jewelry which had been pledged by one Manning tb the defendant.
At the time of the pledge Manning had granted to the plaintiff a
bill of sale, which comprised, not only the stock-in-trade then be-
longing to Manning, but also all stock-in-trade which should be after-
wards acquired by him. The only question is as regards stock
which was not then the property of Manning, but was afterwards
acquired by him, and brought to his shop. The first question is
whether, by virtue of that bill of sale, the plaintiff acquired any
legal property in that after-acquired stock-in-trade. The case of
ffolroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191, decided (though with
considerable doubt among those members of the House of Lords
who bad been trained in the common-law courts) that in equity,
when there was an assignment for value of property not then
belonging to the assignor, there was an implied obligation on his
part to convey the property when it was sufficiently identified.
Then, as equity considers that what a man has bound himself to
do must be considered as effectual as if it has been done, there is,
therefore, in equity an assignment of the after-acquired property.
But it was there laid down in terms that in law such an assign-
ment would be of no effect, the doctrine of the common-law courts
being that an assignment of property not in existence is null
and void, but that in equity such an assignment, if for value, was a
good equitable assignment. That was not only recognised in
tolroyd v. Marshall, but also in Lunn v. Thornton, 1 0. B. 379,
which was very like the present case, as an assignment of future
property. The Judicature Act has not swept away such distinc-
tions. It has often to be said that the primary object of the act
was to enable all courts to recognise all rights whether legal or
equitable, and not to treat legal and equitable rights as the same,
but that though at law equitable rights ought to be effectual, yet
that effect should be given to legal rights where they were to pre-
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vail. By section 25 (11), "Generally, in all matters not hereinbe-
fore particularly mentioned, in which there is any conflict or vari-
ance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law
with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail."
To see the effect of that the previous parts of the section must be
looked at. But it is merely necessary here to look at sub-section
10, which says, " In questions relating to the custody and educa-
tion of infants the rules of equity shall prevail." In my opinion
sub-section 11 was not intended to alter the effect in law of an as-
signment as it previously stood, but simply to say that the courts
in administering rights in law and equity should adopt the rules of
equity, and not to say that an assignment previously inoperative at
common law should be considered to be operative. I re-state this
though I have already stated it, perhaps in other words, in Clem-
ents v. Matthews, 11 Q. B. Div. 808. That being so, this deed
purporting to assign after-acquired property, in my opinion, gives
the assignee only an equitable title in such property. But it is
said that there may be a contract that, on certain things being
done, the property when selected should become the property of
the assignee. But the contract here is a contract which purports,
to do that which the common law says cannot be done, and the
common law, not adopting the principles of equity, says that it
shall be void.
That being so, the conclusion is that, as regards the particular
chattels in question, the plaintiff has only an equitable title. The
legal title remained in Manning subject to his contract with the
plaintiff. Equity does not deprive a person of the benefit of a
legal title unless there is some equity against it, and he has notice
of the existence of a prior equity. The question is whether it can
be shown that the defendant had notice of the equitable right of the
plaintiff. There is nothing in the evidence to lead to that conclu-
sion. All that could be said was that here was a man pledging his
stock-in-trade and that the defendant ought to have inquired whether
there was a bill of sale. In my opinion that was not right. If there
had been afiything to lead a reasonable man to suppose that there
was a bill of sale, then, if he had not made the usual search, he
would suffer accordingly. To accede to the argument would be to
carry the doctrine of constructive notice to an absurd extent. I
shall not extend that doctrine, which -I think has gone far enough,
if not too far. There was nothing here to lead the defendant to
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suspect that there was a bill of sale protecting these chattels. The
appeal, therefore, must succeed. Possibly a distinction must be
drawn between a legal and an equitable title, but HUDDLESTO N , B.,
relied upon the case of Lazarus v. Andrade, 5 0. P. D. 318,
before LOPES, J. That decision was right, because the question
there was between an execution creditor and the person entitled
to the equitable interest in the property, and an execution creditor
does not stand in the same position as the defendant here. But
LOPES, J., did refer to the Judicature Acts as giving a legal
effect to assignments which are only available in equity. Therefore,
so far as HUDDLESTON, B., relied upon an expression of opinion
by LOPES, J., our decision shows that that expression is not in
accordance with the law.
LINDLEY, L. J.-I am also of the same opinion. The plaintiff
must establish either-first, that the legal title was in himself, or,
secondly, that he had an equitable title in the goods, and that the
defendant had notice of it when he. acquired the goods. As to the
first point, I confess that I cannot see how it has been made out
consistently with the authorities. The clause at the end of the
deed shows that the plaintiff knew that he had not got a legal title.
The operation of the deed was to transfer the legal property in the
existing stock-in-trade, but an equitable title in that to be acquired
afterwards. The plaintiff has an equitable title, and he can only
deprive the defendant of his title by showing that the defendant had
prior notice of the equitable title. The doctrine of constructive
notice has not been carried so far as was suggested. It appears to
me that our conclusion must be that the appeal must be allowed,
and that judgment must be entered for the defendant with costs.
Appeal allowed.
The American law is quite well set- point) ; Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347;
tied, in accord with Joseph v. Lyons, that Codman v. Freeman, 3 Cush. 306; Ches-
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4 Ohio St. 481 ; Comstock v. Scales, 7
Wis. 159; Hunter v. Bosworth, 43 Id.
583; Hunt v. Bullock, 23 Ill. 320; Roy
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And this seems to be so even though
such bill of sale or mortgage specifically
describes the property intended to be
subsequently acquired ; for the reason Is
equally valid that a person cannot con-
vey what he does not then own, whether
specified or not; and it is quite generally
agreed that his efforts to do so by ex-
pressly stating in his bill of sale or mort-
gage that the same shall apply to and
include after-acquired property, either in
addition to or substitution for that which
is owned at the time, is entirely ineffect-
ual in a court of law : Moody v. Wright,
13 Met. 17 ; Barnard v. Eaton, 2 Cush.
294; Codman v. Freeman, 3 Id. 306;
Griffith v. Douglass, 73 Me. 532 ; Ham-
ilton v. Rogers, 8 Md. 301 ; Wight v.
Bircher, 5 Mo. App. 322; Parker v.
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And most courts apply this rule not
only in favor of subsequent innocent
purchasers or mortgagees from the same
grantor after he has acquired the addi-
tional property, but also to his attaching
creditors who have duly taken the same
by legal process against the grantor,
after the goods have come into his owner-
ship and possession.
In some courts a second mortgagee or
purchaser, with actual notice of a prior
mortgage or bill of sale purporting to
convey the after-acquired property in-
cluded in such second conveyance, is
held to be affected by such notice, and
not to take a good title as against the
first: American Cigar Co. v. Foster, 36
Mich. 368 ; Robson v. Michigan Central
Railroad, 37 Id. 70; M cGee v. .Fltzer,
37 Tex. 27 ; and some others.
But the mere registry of a prior mort-
gage, as held in the principal case, has
been held not to affect a subsequent
mortgagee, in good faith with construc-
tive notice of the prior mortgage : Jones
v. Richardson, 10 Met. 493; Single v.
Phelps, 20 Wis. 398 ; Mowry v. White,
21 Id. 417 . and it is not easy to see
why actual knowledge of a prior mort-
gage, invalid as to third persons, so far as
it applies to unowned property, can
change a rule of law and make it valid
against a subsequent mortgagee or cred-
itor who takes it from the possession of
the owner before any act of appropria-
tion of it under the former mortgage.
But this rule against a valid sale or
mortgage of property not then owned by
the mortgagor or vendor, does not pre-
vail, even at law, in two classes of cases.
One is where, after the acquisition of
such included future property, some suffi-
cient act of appropriation thereof has
taken place between the vendor and ven-
dee, or mortgagor and mortgagee. Be-
fore the rights of any third person has
attached, in such cases, the first transfer
becomes complete and valid. Thus, if a
mortgage expressly includes property not
then owned but expected to be acquired,
and after such acquisition the mortgagor
actually delivers the same into the posses-
sion of the mortgagee, or if the latter,
more especially under a clause in the mort-
gage authorizing it, has seized and ac-
tually taken possession of the same,
before any subsequent mortgage, sale,
attachment, or seizure on execution has
been made, the party claiming under
this latter title can not object to the
original invalidity of the first mortgage,
but the first title will become perfect, at
least from and after the time of such new
appropriation : Bac. Max. Reg. 14;
Congreve v. Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; Hope
v. Hayley, 5 El. & Bl. 830 ; Carr v.
Allatt, 3 H. & N. 964; Rowley v. Rice,
11 Met. 333; Cook v. Corthell, 11 . I.
482; Moody v. Wright, 13 Met. 17 ;
Brown v. Webb, 20 Ohio 389 ; Titus v.
Mabee, 25 Ill. 257 ; Chynoweth v: Tenney,
10 Wis. 097 ; Booker v. Jones, 55 Ala.
